AbstrACt the paper argues first for the immense importance of the question whether we possess free will for philosophical anthropology, ethics, penal law, and religion, showing that the personhood of man is incompatible with a negation of his free will. It proceeds by discussing briefly the essence and levels of free will, showing that free will is an irreducible archdatum (urphenomenon) that in spite of its indefinability allows for an analysis and unfolding of its essential qualities. the paper then distinguishes the different dimensions of human free will as cause of action and intentional response to goods and values, and discusses their relation to morality. It then shows that the central phenomena of "cooperative freedom" and of the "gift of self" are the supreme fulfillment of persons. Lastly, different arguments for the actual existence of human freedom are explored: a) an argument from the immediate evidence of freedom in the cogito; b) from the evidence of "eternal truths" or "necessary and supremely intelligible essences" about free will; c) from the experience of moral calls and oughts; d) from the undeniability of free will without contradiction; and e) from the experience of acts whose objects (persons and their acts) presuppose free will. through these "five ways" the evidence that we do indeed possess free will can be attained.
the Immense Importance of the Question Whether We Are Free
There is hardly anything that could be more fundamental for the understanding of the human being qua person than the comprehension of the nature of freedom and an answer to the question whether we humans are in fact free. From the onset a purely philosophical grasp of the person is enough to see the inseparable link between person and freedom so that one can say on purely philosophical-rational grounds: an "unfree person" is a contradictio in adiecto, a contradiction in itself -just like "iron wood."
Freedom belongs so essentially to personhood that no being can be called a person if she, in principle and as subject awakened to rational conscious life, 1 were entirely determined from without-by physical forces, by her own nature, by other persons, or even by God-rather than being capable of engendering acts by her free center, by herself. Even a child's pre-philosophical experience of freedom is enough to see that if a person were not free responsibility and morality could not exist, good and evil would be illusions. Without freedom there would be no guilt but also no merit; instead, praise and blame would be just as senseless as punishment and reward. If this is the case, the moral conscience that urges us to do the good even when we hesitate to do it and makes present to us our obligations, warns us not to commit evil, or reprimands us for having done something wrong, would be based on a big delusion. The act of promising, of breaking or keeping promises, or of giving a gift would all cease to be what they are and be reduced to their mere semblance: gratitude 2 or reproach would all be absurd nonsense. All these dimensions so essential to personal human life would be deprived of their foundation if human persons were not free.
Christianity (but also Judaism and Islam) would be an absurdity without human and divine freedom. 9 Without the person possessing freedom, which implies that the free subject is not wholly determined by nature or by any cause extrinsic to herself, none of the chief Christian beliefs would be true. One might say without exaggeration that the entire internal structure of the Christian faith-or at the very least its logical conditions-would break down if humans and angels, and if God did not truly possess freedom. Let us see this more distinctly in the following.
Without acknowledging the freedom of the created person, God would be the origin of all evils and thus a hyper-demonic being.
Every metaphysics that denies the freedom of humans and of angels, and therefore does not recognize the abuse of freedom as the source and first cause of all the manifold evils that obviously exist in the world, blames these evils on God 10 or-if one is an atheist-on an unfree natural cause. In either of these two cases moral evil would not exist at all among human beings. Without freedom, even if humans and angels were determined to be evil, they would be innocent like lambs or like puppets. On the other hand, God, as long as His existence is not altogether denied, becomes the source of all evil and suffering and would himself be evil. Therefore the denial of human and angelic freedom either leads to atheism or to polytheism, or to a transformation of God into a super-demon-infinitely more terrible than Satan, because all evils from the beginning to the end of the world would be God's fault alone, which cannot be said of Satan. 11 In contrast to Satan's limited causal role regarding other evils besides his own-if man and angels were not free and if therefore, granted his existence, God had brought into the world all meanness, all lies, all adulteries, all perjuries, rapes, murders, thefts, tortures, hate and envy, genocide and other crimes (including Satan's and his angels' sins) or if He had determined angels and humans to commit them, He would be the only ultimate source of evil. One cannot imagine a more terrible destruction of the idea of God. God would be an Anti-God. In 14 
The Presocratic philosopher Parmenides had recognized this clearly early on. See also my personalist version of the tertia via of Thomas Aquinas, the proof of the existence of God from the
unfree causes in nature or in God explain the wonder of a free will in finite beings. Freedom in the world can come into being only from a free act of the absolute Being. Therefore, if God were not free, neither the contingent (non-necessarily existent) world nor free agents in it could exist. Therefore, to deny God's freedom of choice while still admitting His existence will lead to some form of pantheism that dissolves human personhood and freedom. 4. By denying divine, angelic and human freedom the entire Judeo-Christian revelation is denied and Holy Scripture rendered a worthless book. God would not be our creator, nor our redeemer, nor would there be divine forgiveness of sins, nor any reason for gratitude towards God for our creation, redemption or for the forgiveness of our sins, because if these were not works of divine free choice, they would be nothing.
Likewise without the freedom of God, of angels and of humans all anthropological content and teachings of Sacred Scripture and of the Church would lose their foundation: We would not be creatures but some moments in a necessarily self-unfolding life of God. There would be no original sin, no personal sin, no redemption from them, no meaning of the divine commandments, nor of any divine promises. The Sermon on the Mount and the call to holiness would not have any sense any more let alone eternal rewards or punishments. All talk of a purgatory, of moral conscience, of the sacraments of confession and baptism or the unction of the sick would be senseless babbling.
In a word: without freedom there is no Christianity! There would also be no Judaism and no Islam, which recognize many of the same truths about God and man! Therefore there is hardly any truth that is more important not only for the metaphysics of the person and our personal life, but also for the Christian and any other theistic faith than this one: that the person, whether human and finite or divine and infinite, is free.
But are we free? Do we possess freedom? And can we know this with our pure human reason or must we only accept this on faith? We need to distinguish two questions: (1) What is the essence of freedom? In what does it consist (which we must understand not only in order to assert but also in order to deny human freedom)? And (2) Does freedom exist? The second question can again be divided into distinct questions: a) whether there is only human (and angelic) freedom, or b) there is only divine freedom, or c) both do, in fact, exist. In this article we shall, after a brief exposition on the nature of freedom, turn only to question (a), whether human freedom exists. Augustine and Descartes insisted, along Freedom is one of those arch-data that cannot be defined in terms of something else or reduced to anything besides itself. It includes, however, many dimensions and traits which can be unfolded and analyzed: It is not only a freedom from determining causes, an "I can but I do not need to," but is also the power of self-determination that makes free acts utterly different from chance-events, with which Heisenberg and many physicists and philosophers of science confused it.
19 Freedom also involves a special form of possession of one's being, which is only possible in and through the free agent's rational consciousness and capacity of self-governance and self-determination. To a person's free determination and governance of herself corresponds also the person's being governed and determined by herself.
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None of this can be understood if we do not recognize that free acts necessarily presuppose and entail consciousness. The term refers not only to immanent conscious states but to an intentional conscious directedness to something over against freedom. This something is an object of which we are conscious, to which we can refer in free acts only because we also are related to them through some rational knowledge and thought. Nothing is willed if it is not known before (nil volitum, nisi praecognitum), or, alternatively, nothing is willed that is not conceived in thought (nil volitum nisi cogitatum one could formulate roughly the immensely differentiated relation between freedom and objects of consciousness. But the consciousness of some objects is not only presupposed by freedom, it characterizes free acts themselves: they relate consciously to their object.
Free acts, however, do not only presuppose some neutral objects such as the number of little pebbles on the street which can be objects of our perception or knowledge. Rather, free acts presuppose some good we aspire to or some evil we seek to avoid; otherwise freedom would sink down to the level of a totally sense-less exercise of changing neutral facts. We cannot meaningfully speak of a free act in an axiological void. In a meaningless and valueless universe free acts would not have any sensible motivation, and freedom itself would sink down to the level of pure empty arbitrariness. An example of the latter would be to say: "I am free to move pebble #2,000.019 from its position at the right of the adjacent pebble to its left."
The object of a meaningful free act must therefore possess some importance that lifts it out of neutrality. This importance can be positive or negative. It can also take fundamentally different forms: it can move just on the level of the merely subjectively satisfying or dissatisfying. For example, pleasure is very often a desirable good but it can continue to motivate us even when such a satisfaction is neither objectively good for us but destructive nor good in itself. Thus we can consume drugs even if we know that they destroy our health, life, and happiness. The Good can also be an objective good for us, and lie in our true interest, which can happen even when we feel subjective dissatisfaction, as when we get freed from a drug-addiction. A being can also possess value in itself, an intrinsic preciousness calling upon an adequate response from us, such as when we say that the human person deserves respect in view of her dignity.
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Freedom is thus not only a freedom from something and a self-determination or lordship over our own acts, but also a freedom for something, that is, the ability to speak a free "yes" or "no" to some object. The close connection between freedom and an object of which we are conscious and which possesses positive or negative importance entails the all-important power to engender from oneself acts by which one freely responds to and takes a stance on objects
See Hildebrand, Ethics ch. 1-3; 17-19. and other persons. This power also enables one to fulfill oughts and obligations issuing from the aforementioned objects in order to give them their due response; it gives one the capacity to serve goods and other persons, 22 and provides one with the ability for self-donation. 23 All these are aspects of the freedom for.
Freedom is also intimately connected with the life of the intellect and involves the capacity to open one's mind in knowledge in order to receive information, to love the truth, to cooperate freely with the process of knowledge, and to consent to some extent freely to that which is known to us. In order to understand the relation between freedom and the different kinds of acts which it renders possible, we must first distinguish two quite different dimensions or perfections of freedom. 25 The first one unfolds in relation to the important object; it involves a free "yes" or a free "no" spoken to it. It is the freedom to respond, to take a stance, to affirm or reject an object or state of affairs.
The second dimension of freedom consists in the will's ability to engender free outward-directed actions and to initiate new causal chains. This is how the will becomes the lord over our external actions and manifests the ability to initiate activities which might then lead to the external realization of states of affairs after "affirming" (willing) them freely in an inner response. The second dimension of freedom may also lead to the creation of objects, works of art, etc., which are not reducible to states of affairs.
The first perfection of free will is deeper and has a much wider scope than the second. directed to objects which the free agent can in no way change, 26 such as God. Another example would be a neighbor who is perhaps a more gifted person than we are, whom we can freely respect and affirm in love, or reject in hate and envy.
27 Still another example is a "cross" or an illness, which we cannot alter but can freely and humbly accept or rebel against.
The second dimension of human freedom chiefly refers to free actions in the strict sense, i.e., to acts which aim at the realization of things that are not yet real but can be realized through me. Within the things that can be brought into being by free acts we distinguish the object-sphere of acting (prattein) from the object-sphere of making (poiein). Acting must be understood in the narrower sense of this term, as that through which we bring about states of affairs, such as saving the life of a person who fell into deep water and could not swim. Making, on the other hand, is that through which we can produce palpable things such as handiwork or works of art. In such actions or creative acts which are geared to the real world outside of ourselves, we initiate those activities which bring about the intended states of affairs or objects of making.
Both dimensions of freedom involve the mysterious inner power to engender acts without any preceding cause, and without our nature forcing us to act. This essence of freedom is common to all free acts and actions and entails an absolutely astonishing feature: due to our freedom we are "the lords over the being and the non-being of our act [ion] The first perfection of the responding will freely affirms a good without necessarily choosing properly, since it also includes the freedom of choice. Free choice, at least in finite persons, is not restricted to choosing the proper means to achieve the good as final end: a free person does not necessarily want as final end the intrinsic good or the happy life or the realization of moral values; the free person thus does not necessarily choose the adequate response to the truth and to morally relevant goods. Instead, the free person can fail to will the first and most important objective goal of freedom -to conform one's life to the truth and to true goods. One can instead choose a life of subjective satisfaction indifferent to intrinsic values and morally relevant goods, and even indifferent to one's own objective good. Thus a free finite person can choose between ultimate ends, between good and evil, between the love of God that has as its highest form the abandonment of self (amor Dei usque ad contemptum sui) and the self-love and lust for pleasure that has as its lowest form the contempt for God (amor sui usque ad contemptum Dei). 29 This choice between the ultimate ends is the chief drama of human freedom. Besides such actual free responses, which one experiences here and now and direct to an object, there are also superactual free responses in a person. These continue to exist in us even when we do not actually experience them or think of them. As we know many things superactually even when we do not think of them, so we find also that concretely lived free acts and responses do not exhaust themselves in our actually experiencing them. Both our responses to individual beings (such as our love for our wife or child) and to general types and whole spheres of value, such as attitudes of reverence, the virtues of justice, of purity, etc., can persist in the form of superactual acts. They manifest themselves in our emotions, feelings, concrete responses and actions, etc. All virtues and vices are superactual acts. They profoundly influence the concrete actual consciousness of a person and are as it were a basso continuo which accompanies the actual melodies of our daily life.
Finally, there is the so-called fundamental moral option for or against all morally relevant goods, for or against God and the whole world of values. This response has the most universal scope of objects. If it gains sturdy roots in a person, it goes beyond being an "option," it becomes the most fundamental moral attitude; this attitude may also be called the general moral attitude. (Lev. 11:44) . See also Lev. 11:45; 19:2; 20:26; 21:8, and 
image of God according to which God, if He corresponded to this image, truly deserves to be rejected in the name of an eternal moral order and in the name of evident moral values. Such a conception of God which would justify the rejection of God includes the widespread deterministic image of a God who would condemn angels and men to eternal punishment for their sins although these sins and the fact that they do evil would solely depend on God's own will against whose decree the creatures could in no way act. An acceptance of such a God would be morally evil, at least if one understands properly what one believes in such a determinist interpretation of sin and hell. Therefore, it is a moral demand to reject such a God who corresponds to this false image. It is also clear that when we presuppose the objective goodness of God this moment of the morally good attitude, the response to God, differs very much depending on the vagueness or clarity of someone's metaphysical conception of God. This element of the morally good attitude towards God stretches from a vague "openness to God" (as even the atheist or agnostic can possess) to the fervent and unconditioned love of God. Many authors thought that the fundamental morally good attitude is restricted to a very formal abstract level, or even is a-thematic in the sense of it having no object at all. This is the "transcendental" conception of the " fundamental option" found in Karl Rahner and other authors and is, in my opinion, in contradiction to the nature of intentional consciousness which must have an object, reducing the fundamental option to an irrational state of consciousness. Of course, if a-thematic were to mean the superactual character of this attitude which continues to exist even when I do not actually perform and live it, it would be quite correct to attribute this to the fundamental moral attitude. If the term meant that this attitude can never be actualized in consciousness, it would again be a false assertion because all superactual attitudes can and should become actually conscious from time to time. The same would apply to the thesis that the fundamental moral attitude can never become the theme or object of reflection. Superactual realities differ wholly from the sphere of the subconscious. See the discussion of the superactuality of virtues in Hildebrand's Ethics.
In
reality, as we now easily see, it can have very rich and concrete objects, embracing them all and branching off into the different concrete virtues which respond to single spheres of morally relevant goods such as rights (justice) or property (honesty), or the dignity and "sacredness" of

C. Cooperative Freedom and the Gift of self as supreme Fulfillment of Persons
It is clear that we cannot directly realize superactual attitudes and virtues by a simple fiat. We can freely engender general moral intentions, but they neither immediately take root in the person nor acquire instantaneously the personal depth proper to superactual virtues. Similarly, we cannot, by a simple fiat of our will, bring about affective responses such as grief, or love, or joy, or compassion, or repentance, however appropriate these spiritual affections are to their objects. 31 Yet this does not imply that we have no freedom or responsibility with respect to our superactual attitudes or to these spiritual affective responses. We come to recognize here two further important manifestations of freedom: (1) the indirect role of our free acts, and (2) cooperative freedom.
(1) A single free action of helping someone lies within the power of our immediate freedom (in spite of the difficulties and limitations we may experience with respect to its actualization), and has an immediate and direct effect 
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On the spiritual forms of affectivity see Hildebrand, The Sacred Heart/Über das Herz.
in the world and on our conscious life. Yet each action has also indirect effects on ourselves; it will influence and gradually change our superactual attitudes and the kind of emotional responses (love or hatred, warmth or envy and bitterness) we give to others. This applies to good as well as to bad actions. 32 Thus we come to understand that our freedom has an enormous indirect influence distinct from the direct freedom by which we bring about free acts.
(2) Even more amazing is what we might term "cooperative freedom." 33 We cannot directly bring about with our free fiat attitudes towards persons or values that result indirectly from many free actions. We cannot, likewise, immediately evoke affective responses of repentance, compassion, or love; they often arise in our nature without us choosing them, and they nevertheless can be, morally and humanly speaking, adequate or inadequate to their human or divine object. Now the fact that all of these acts and feelings do not obey our immediate free command does not preclude the fact that they are in many ways influenced indirectly by our free acts. Thus the free acts of repeated adultery will give rise to an impure and unfaithful attitude and to kinds of feelings towards one's wife and other women that a faithful husband will not himself experience.
Besides the indirect freedom that exerts a great influence on such data of the moral life as virtues and vices and affections, we also have another important capacity: cooperative freedom. The latter refers to our relating freely and in a particularly intimate way to those realities within us that arise without freedom. We can conspire freely with the tears of repentance that arise in us, or suppress them; we can freely disavow feelings of hatred or identify ourselves with them. We can cooperate with emotions of love and form them freely from within by sanctioning them. We are touching here upon that which constitutes the very heart of human freedom. The recognition of cooperative freedom even modifies what we have said about freedom at the beginning of this paper, namely, the description of freedom in terms of our being "the lords 32 There are many other forms of the indirect influence of our freedom. When we meditate on our lives, for example, instead of acting thoughtlessly and without the necessary reflection, we will influence our lives indirectly. Yet this act of meditation itself we can command, we can take time to think about the purpose of our lives or hunt from pleasure to pleasure, from noise to noise and divert ourselves in the negative sense described by Pascal (136) . See also Seifert, 33 See Hildebrand, Ethics ch. 25, "Cooperative Freedom." over the being and the non-being of our acts." This characterization of freedom in terms of autonomy does not adequately describe many other aspects such as the freedom manifested in the grateful receiving of gifts, in gratitude as such, and in cooperative freedom.
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In many cases, the highest of which involve divine grace, we find in our soul gifts and experiences of joy or love which arise in us but are not products of our freedom. Yet inasmuch as such movements of our soul are adequate or inadequate to their object, good or bad, we must not let them arise in us without the involvement of our freedom. When these movements are bad, we ought to disavow them, thereby not immediately eradicating them but "decapitating" them, as it were. We can freely say "no" to our feeling of intense envy, when we realize its evilness and inappropriateness. This is not an act of repression but, on the contrary, an act of conscious confrontation with one's self. By disavowing feelings of envy, the person disassociates herself from them. Thus they become movements of the soul for which we are no longer responsible in the way in which we are responsible when we let envy grow in us without taking such a free stance.
Much more profound is the interpenetration of freedom and positive affective responses, or other non-free experiences and gifts in us. When a deep love or feeling of repentance is granted to us -a feeling or movement of our soul which we never could have given to ourselves -our freedom is not fated to remain outside such gifts. It can join in with the gift. We can freely sanction our affective response or an attitude of our will so that we are able to provide what is due an object or a person, and recognize that it has the character of a gift and therefore does not stand simply within our power. By such a free sanctioning of these acts, we integrate them into our free life. Analogously, we can appropriate and accept into our freedom all intentional and good acts which arise in our soul, including our acceptance and conviction of the truth. Furthermore, we can, in the sphere of the intellect, integrate by a free sanction and affirm from within convictions that arise organically and on their own from our cognition. Given the rationality of the conviction and its character as a theoretical and adequate response to reality (or states of affairs), we can also sanction it or add to convictions resulting simply from knowledge (being convinced by the object known) others that have the character of free real assent. 35 We can speak a free "yes" to truth, a response which takes on a new role when it is not merely based on evident knowledge but on probable knowledge, or on faith. 36 We can turn that which is given to us as a gift into a free act, by freely sanctioning such gifts. Gift and freedom interpenetrate each other here. We might speak 37 of a spiritual wedding of our will with our affections 38 and with other noble movements or acts in us, including the assent to truth. By affections which well up in us as gifts, such as deep emotions of love, our will is enriched and allowed to partake as it were in the wealth of those affections and of other movements of the soul which possess the character of a gift. Thus the deepest dimensions of freedom do not actualize themselves simply by the free center of the person alone. They are not even solely formed by, as well as dependent upon, the value of the object which gives purpose and meaning to our freedom.
Rather, the deepest dimension of human freedom requires a gift which precedes it and a cooperation with such a gift through which freedom can attain its supreme dignity.
39 This is true in a special way of the deepest act of freedom realized only in love and in the gift of Self, in which we give to the other not only a response or a something in ourselves, do not only perform acts, but give our very self to the other. This self-donation in love requires in its fullness in the human level the gift of the affective response to the beloved person which we cannot produce ourselves but only sanction with our free will. In this ultimate sense, then, "to be free" means to cooperate with gifts on the natural (and, as the Christian believes, also the supernatural) order. Without using our freedom in cooperation with such gifts we can never attain We have already said that on purely philosophical grounds freedom inseparably belongs to personhood. Now we have to make some fundamental distinctions within what we call freedom, namely between: 1) freedom as a faculty (power) inseparable from personhood; 2) freedom as an ability here and now to perform free acts; and 3) freedom as the activation of this ability in actually performing free acts. Only the latter two imply the conscious life, the self-determination and other traits of freedom mentioned above. The faculty of freedom or the free will (sense 1) belongs substantially to the person qua person and exists in every person. This is not true of freedom in senses (2) and (3). Certainly, the faculty of freedom is also ordained to be exercised in conscious actualization. This is the only time we can encounter and experience freedom, as well as gain the metaphysical insight into its bearer, the person, and into the existence of the free power and of free potentialities which must exist prior to their actualizations in free acts. On the other hand, and equally certainly, neither the actual ability to perform free acts nor the actual use of it in these acts themselves is inseparable from personhood. They are not found in embryos and new-born babies, unconscious or comatose patients and in persons afflicted by certain types of grave mental retardation or psychic compulsion, and are absent in all human beings during sleep. But to be a person entails the fundamental metaphysical faculty, a capacity in principle to perform free acts. 41 As faculty, freedom resides on the level of the substantial being of
This fact, which is evident on the level of affective experiences and general attitudes and convictions, is much more evident on the level of Christian faith where we understand the supreme act of freedom to lie in a free acceptance of and cooperation with divine grace. Faith is a free act of " faith in" and submission to God, and a consequent "belief that" what He reveals to us is true.
Even more profoundly, the supernatural love of caritas, without which we cannot speak a "Totus Tuus," requires the gift of grace.
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See Augustine, The City of God V, [8] [9] [10] [11] especially V, 9; Kierkegaard VII, I, 141 In our discussion of the essence of freedom we already presupposed all along, and as we shall see with good reason, that we as human persons are free. We spoke of us being able to take free stances, to command actions, to cooperate, etc. Nevertheless, we must distinguish sharply between knowing the essence of freedom and knowing the existence of human freedom. In principle, to gain an insight into all we saw about the essence of freedom does not yet imply that we actually are free, that freedom actually exists in the human being, either in actu or in potencia, as fundamental faculty of the person. We can understand full well the fundamental difference between grasping the essence of freedom and knowing the existence of human freedom. This is evident because the determinist who denies the existence of human freedom need sto understand as well the essence of that which he denies. Can we then know that human freedom exists and that we actually are free?
If human freedom did not exist, human beings would not be persons, as we had already seen -but why should this be impossible? Maybe humans are not persons, as those countless philosophies that deny human freedom imply.
That it is one of the innumerable "eternal truths"
42 that "person and freedom are inseparable," still leaves the question unanswered: Does freedom exist in man? All the facts about the essence of freedom and personhood say nothing yet about human beings actually possessing this astonishing faculty. Is it not a prerogative of God to be Lord over the being and the non-being of a thing by a simple inner word or fiat, without the person being determined to such a fiat by any cause other than his or her own free center?
Is there then such a god-like quality in any finite person as to be the lord over the being and non-being of her acts? Answering this question affirmatively, as we implicitly did, obliges us to answer also how we can know that we are free. I will point out in the following five ways how in fact we know that we are free:
A. A First response: the Immediate Evidence of Freedom in the Cogito
The first answer to our question imposes itself on us: the god-like attribute of the free human person, "for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not," as Augustine says, is something we experience in consciously living our being and in performing free acts. It is a given that is just as immediate as our own existence is.
We can reach this knowledge of the real existence of our freedom in actually experiencing it from within -as part of the indubitable evidence of the cogito. It can be known with the same immediacy as our own existence, or in a sense even more immediately, because, as Augustine says, even if we were mistaken, per impossibile, about our own existence, it would still be evident to us that we would not want to be deceived, and in this will not to be deceived we experience the evidence of our freedom. Of course, objectively speaking, the knowledge of the real existence of our freedom depends on the evidence of our existence in the Cogito, sum, but it is concretized in such a way that we can clearly understand that the evidence for this knowledge somehow exceeds that for any other knowledge.
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Thus we may say that nothing is more evident to us than our freedom: our very existence and conscious life are not more indubitably given, though per- Seifert, "To Be a Person -To Be Free." haps more easily understood, than our freedom. And indeed we know of our freedom with the same type of immediate and thereupon reflective evidence with which we know of our own existence. 45 The awareness of our own free will -a knowledge which is so evident that it cannot be a deception -is in fact part of the evidence of the famous Cogito in René Descartes and even more in its richer and more adequate Augustinian version. 46 And the existence of free will in us is so evident that its evidence in a certain sense is more primary and indubitable than that of all other evident truths given in the Cogito.
Of course, this priority is not to be understood absolutely, for without the evidence of our existence and thinking activity our freedom and will could not be given as well. Nevertheless, Augustine's remark is valid secundum quid, in the following sense: that if we assumed, per impossibile, that all other truths given in the Cogito could be doubtful, we could still be certain that we would freely want and wish to avoid error and to reach the truth. For even if we could be in error about all things, it would still remain true that we do not want to be in error, and of this free will we can have certain knowledge. As Augustine states:
Likewise if someone were to say: 'I do not will to err,' will it not be true that whether he errs or does not err, yet he does not will to err? Would it not be the height of impudence of anyone to say to this man: 'Perhaps you are deceived,' since no matter in what he may be deceived, he is certainly not deceived in not willing to be deceived? And if he says that he knows this, he adds as many known things as he pleases, and perceives it to be an infinite number. For he who says, 'I do not will to be deceived, and I know that I do not will this, (Augustine, De Trinitate XV, xii, 21) 48 See the full text:
Vivere se tamen et meminisse, et intelligere, et velle, et cogitare, et scire, et judicare quis dubitet? Quandoquidem etiam si dubitat, vivit; si dubitat, unde dubitet, meminit; si dubitat, dubitare se intelligit; si dubitat, certus esse vult; si dubitat, cogitat; si dubitat, scit [Descartes] says, 'is so evident that it must be counted among the first and most common notions that are innate in us.' 50 Thus, starting from the immediate self-experience of our conscious life, we gain the evidence that we possess the freedom to will not to err, and in a similar manner proceed to the more general evident knowledge of our freedom expressed by Augustine thus: for we do many things which, if we were not willing, we should certainly not do. This is primarily true of the act of willing itself-for if we will, it is; if we will not, it is not...
Augustine continues a little further down:
Our wills, therefore, exist as wills, and do themselves whatever we do by willing, and which would not be done if we were unwilling.
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The evidence of this knowledge cannot even be refuted by any and all possible forms of self-deception because these already imply or presuppose the evidence of free will, particularly the evidence that we can will "not to be deceived," as Augustine says. b. the Evidence of Our Own Freedom in the Light of the "Eternal truths" or "Necessary and supremely Intelligible Essences and Wesensgesetze"
An extremely important advantage of the Augustinian over the Cartesian Cogito lies in Augustine's clear grasp that the unique inner perception that we really exist through our intimate conscious contact with our being and life "from within" is connected with the light of eternal truths, with an insight into necessary essences and states of affairs that are independent from our individual person but without knowledge of which we could also not understand the existence of anything. An example would be that we do not only immediately perceive from within that we live and are conscious but we understand at the same time the universal truth of the principle of contradiction, that "nothing can exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense," or, alternatively, that "deception and error requires the real existence of the person who errs or is deceived; therefore, nobody who errs and is deceived can fail to exist." And as we perceive the concrete fact of our own existence in the light of these eternal truths, so can we also perceive our own freedom in the light of the eternal truths about the essence of freedom that we discussed above. Thus we could arrive at the following formulation: in understanding what freedom is, we at the same time perceive in ourselves the actually existing power to act freely. The light of the insights into the universal facts about the nature of freedom at the same time allows us to understand clearly the instantiation of freedom in our own being and conscious life.
C. the Knowledge of Freedom through the Mediation of the Experience of Moral Calls and Oughts
There is another way to know that we are free: 53 we all feel that we ought to do and not to do certain things. Not only is an ought senseless without freedom, we actually experience freedom as co-given with the ought itself. In a similar way, 54 the call issuing from values for us to give them their due response-which is, as a matter of fact, the main rational reason for an oughtcannot be perceived without at the same time knowing our freedom, without which we could never duly respond to the call. For while we can also give an affective response-one that is not within our free power to engender and yet is still due to a great work of art or to a beloved person-this due response still calls for a free sanction without which our response does not enter fully in relation with due-ness. Thus in the experience of any "ought" or call to give a due response, we are given in the same evidence with which we know that we ought to do or to omit something, or to perform an inner act due to a beautiful or good object or person, our freedom as well. Freedom is the only conceivable addressee of an ought or call for a due response. No conceivable unfree reaction can ever refer to an ought or to a call from a value per se. We can thus say that nobody can know of an ought or a call to give an adequate response to a good without knowing that she is free; hence in knowing such oughts and calls for a due response, we also know that we are free. 
55
A fourth kind of argument on behalf of our freedom is the objectivist transcendental argument that everybody who denies freedom already presupposes it. We presuppose in the act of denying freedom and in insisting that we and everyone else should recognize the truth that there is no freedom, the evidence that we and other persons are free. And it is only for that reason we 54 Hildebrand has shown as well in his Ethics ch. 1-3; 17-18, that can possibly have a moral responsibility towards ourselves and towards others to publicize this alleged truth. We can thus see that in all of these judgments in which we reject freedom we actually contradict our deterministic view and presuppose the evidence of freedom. An excellent form of this kind of "transcendental argument" for freedom and against determinism can be found in Hans Jonas, who in his book Macht oder Ohnmacht der Subjektivität, brilliantly refutes the materialist ontology and the deterministic account of mind. 56 Jonas opens his book by relating the historical fact that a group of young physiologists (students of the famous Johannes Müller) met regularly in the house of the physicist Gustav Magnus in Berlin. Two of them (Ernst Brücke and Emil du Bois-Reymond) made a formal pact to spread the truth "that no other forces are at work in the organism except chemical-physical ones." Before long even the young Helmholtz joined them in this solemn promise. Later all three men became famous in their fields and remained faithful to their agreement.
Jonas shows, however, that the very fact of this promise already contradicted, without them noticing it, the very content of their promise, or rather, the materialist theory and negation of freedom which they pledged to promote throughout their career. For they did not bind themselves, and could not have bound themselves, to leave to the molecules of their brain their respective course of action because the course of molecular events in their brains, according to their opinion, was wholly determined since the beginning of the world. They could not have bound themselves by means of their promise to allow these molecules to determine all their speaking and thinking in the future. (This would have been equally senseless for the same reasons.) Rather, they pledged fidelity to their present insight or more accurately, to their false opinion. They declared by their pact, at least for themselves, that their subjectivity was master over their action. In the very act of making this promise they trusted something entirely non-physical, namely their relationship to what they took to be the truth and to their freedom to decide over their action. Moreover, they ascribed precisely to this factor a determining power over their brains and bodies -a power, however, that had been denied by the content of their thesis. To promise something, with the essentially included conviction of being able to keep such a promise and likewise being free to break it, admits the force of freedom at work "in the organism" of man. Faithfulness to one's 56 It is regrettable that he did not explicitly reject the kind of biologistic monism he defended in some of his earlier essays, as those collected in The Phenomenon of Life.
promise is such a force. Thus, the very "act of vowing always to deny freedom and any non-physical force" solemnly confirmed the existence of the freedom and the "non-physical forces" that they denied! E. the Evidence of Freedom Obtained by the Experience of Acts whose Objects (Persons and their Acts) Presuppose Freedom A fifth way to reach the knowledge that human persons are free is to investigate the ontological and anthropological conditions of acts directed at us or at other persons, as well as the evidence regarding their object and subject upon which these acts are based. Thus one could show how not only the act of vowing or promising, but also the essentially self-directed act of repentance of one's own sins 57 or the essentially other-directed act of gratitude or forgiveness, and many further fundamental human acts, all presuppose the evidence of freedom not only in the subject-person but also in the object-person of these acts. We find the act of gratitude, for example, rooted in the evidence of freedom of both the subject-person (since a forced gratitude would be no gratitude at all, but would be like "wooden iron") and of the object-person to whom we are grateful and who gave us a freely given gift.
58 It would be senseless to thank anybody if we did not understand and believe that she acted freely as well as kindly towards us or to persons dear to us. We cannot thank a machine or marionette. In the act of repenting we also find the evidence of our freedom at its root: it would be absolutely senseless to repent what our nature compelled us to do. Likewise, when we forgive some wrong done to us by another person, we necessarily presuppose and also possess a certain degree of evidence that she is a free agent. 59 The same is true when we exhort or praise, admonish, chide, condemn, or encourage her. Crespo. Hence, through this five-fold way we can indeed know that we are free and thus unambiguously answer our title-question: "Yes, we are free!" All of us, deep down inside, know from childhood on this immensely important truth that philosophy can only bring out from the dark into the light, as a midwife helps the already existing child to reach the light of the day. So I hope that you have arrived at a clearer understanding of what you knew all along: "Yes, I am free!" Josef M. Seifert, born in Austria in 1945, is one of the major representatives of realist phenomenology. He earned his PhD from the University of Salzburg and his Habilitation from the University of Munich. Prof. Seifert is the director of the doctoral program of philosophy at the University of Dallas, and has also taught in Liechtenstein and in the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile. He was the Founding Director of the International Academy of Philosophy, as well as the Founding Editor of the yearbook Aletheia. Prof. Seifert has published more than twenty books and more than 300 articles that cover all fields of philosophy and that have been translated into twelve languages. Prof. Seifert has received several awards, among which are the European Union Medal of Merit, the EU Order of Merit, and the "Austrian Cross of Merit for Science and Art 1st Class." He was also given a Doctorate, honoris causa, in 2007.
